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1 Introduction
One of the strongest normative objections to violations of the independence axiom is that 
such behavior involves dynamiCally inconsistent decisions in compound lotteries. A com­
pound lottery is a two-stage lottery in which the first stage uses a randomizing device to 
select a lottery to be played at the second stage. We use the notation (X1 ,p1; . . .  ; Xm,Pm) 
to denote the compound lottery that yields the simple lottery X; with probability p;. It 
is widely argued that if a decision maker's preferences violate the independence axiom, 
then he is vulnerable to Dutch books. For example, suppose X >- Y, but for some Z 
and a E (0,1), (Y,a;Z,1 - a) >- (X,a;Z,1 - a). Suppose the decision maker holds a 
ticket for the compound lottery (X, a; Z, 1 - a). Offer him the opportunity to switch, 
for a small amount of money (say e:) , to the compound lottery (Y, a; Z, 1 - a), which he
will accept. If the Z-event happens, let him play Z. However, if the Y-event happens, 
offer him, for another small amount of money (say e:') , the opportunity to trade Y for
X. Since X is preferred to Y, he will accept this offer too. Eventually, he plays the 
compound lottery (X - e:' - e:, a; Z - t:, 1 - a) , which is stochastically dominated by his
original holding. (See Raiffa [26, Chapter 4.9], Green [l l ], and Machina [21]. ) 
A similar argument against violations of expected utility theory may be found in 
Border [2] or Fishburn [10]. There a decision maker is asked to make contingent choices. 
If theses choices are not consistent with expected utility maximization of an increasing 
utility, then there is a compound lottery for which the decision maker's contingent choices 
are stochastically dominated. Thus, for this compound lottery, the decision maker is not 
willing to stand by his announced choices. His ex ante preferences are not the same as 
his ex post preferences. 
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Machina [21] (see also McClennen [23, 24]) argues that dynamic consistency should 
not require that the ex post preference relation has to be the same as the decision 
maker's ex ante preference. Rather, the ex post preference relation should be the same 
as the one the decision maker ex ante plans to use ex post. Only under expected utility 
do these two definitions coincide. Formally, the proposed definition of dynamic con­
sistency is this. Suppose that ex ante the decision maker faces the compound lottery 
(X1,p1; . . .  ; Xm, Pm)· If the outcome of the compound lottery is X;, then the decision
maker ex post weakly prefers Y to Z if and only if (Xi,p1; . . .  ;Y,p;; . . . ;Xm,Pm) >r 
(Xi,p1; . . .  ;Z,p;; . . . ;Xm,Pm) ex ante.
In this framework, it is not a well posed question to ask a non-expected utility max­
imizer to make contingent choices without specifying the probabilities used, as the ex­
perience of the risk at the first stage affects the preferences of the decision maker in the 
second stage. The above definition allows ex post preferences to depend on the ex ante 
distribution of lotteries and the actual outcome of the first stage. We analyze below some 
of the implications of this definition, and reach some unexpected conclusions. 
To illustrate our major result, consider a preference relation >r that is quadratic in 
the probabilities (see Machina [20] and Chew, Epstein, and Segal [5]). That is, it can be 
represented by 
· 
Q(Fx) = j j cp(x,y)dFx(x)dFx(y)
for some symmetric function <p: 111.2 -+ Ill., where Fx is the cumulative distribution function 
of X. For a finite lottery X = (x1,p1; . . .  ; Xn, Pn) we have
Q(Fx) = L LPiP;<p(x;, x;). 
i j 
Let Y = (y1,q1; . . .  ;ym,qm) and consider the compound lottery (Y,l - c:;Z, c:). If 
the Z-event happens, then the updated preference relation can be represented by the 
function 
W(·) = Q(c:Fc·l + (1 - c:)Fy ) .
For X = (x1, Pi; ... ; Xn, Pn) we obtain
J 
- (1 - c:)2Q(Fy) + c: [c:Q(Fx) + 2(1 - c:) LL p;q;<p(x;, Yi)]. 
i j 
This function is ordinally equivalent to 
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Now consider what happens to this as c becomes small. That is, what happens to ex 
post preferences after a low probability event has been realized. It is easy to see that for 
our quadratic case, 
W'(X) ,_0 LLP;qj<p(x;,yj)· 
j 
Let w(x) = L:; q;r.p(x, Y;) and the expression in (1) becomes 
W'(X) = LP;w(x;), 
i 
which is an expected utility functional. 
(1) 
This is not a peculiarity of the quadratic preference functional. It happens for all non­
expected preferences that are representable by a differentiable functional, and that satisfy 
a very weak regularity condition, which we introduce in Section 3. Nonetheless, most 
alternatives to expected utility described in the literature satisfy our hypotheses. We 
show that if ex ante preferences are continuously differentiable, then dynamic consistency 
implies that ex post preferences after a low probability event occurs are close to expected 
utility preferences. 
Figure 1 gives a hint of this last claim. Consider a set of lotteries represented as a 
subset of lll.2• Let X, Y, and Z be three lotteries. Let);= be represented by V and define 
the "local" preference relation >rz,. by X );=z,. Y if and only if V((l - c)Z + cX) � 
V((l -c)Z + cY). For c sufficiently close to 0, X >-z,. Y if and only if the segment cd 
joining (1-c )Z +cX and (1-c )Z +c:Y is steeper than the tangent to the indifference curve 
at Z. For any T and a E (0, l] , the segment ab connecting aX +(1-a)T and aY +(1-a)T 
Figure 1: Why local preferences obey the independence axiom. 
is parallel to XY. Likewise, the segment ef connecting (1 - c)Z + c:[aX + (1 -a)T] and 
(1 - c)Z + c[aY + (1 - a)T] is parallel to ab. Therefore, defining );=z to be the limit of 
the orders >,=z,. it follows that X );=z Y if and only if aX + (1 - a)T );=z aY + (1 - a)T. 
In other words, the order );= z satisfies the Independence Axiom, and can therefore be 
renrP�PntPH hv ::in PvnArt.orl .. t;1;1- .  � f.,....,,..t-;,.,. ..... .,.l ,. !"' .. ���• .. "'-'� �J �.L.L '-'"''",t"'-''-'V"-'U U\H.l.llJJ 1U.l.l\.,lJ.lV1J.0.lo 
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Algebraically what is happening is this. If ex ante preferences are represented by 
a numerical function V, then the ex post preferences >,:z,e are represented by U,(X) = 
V((l - c:)Z + c:X). This is ordinally equivalent to
W,(X) = 
V((l - c:)Z + c:X) - V(Z)' 
c; 
which converges to the derivative of V at Z, as c; -+ 0. The derivative is a linear
functional, and linearity corresponds to expected utility preferences. Note that the U, 's 
themselves need not converge to the derivative. 
The reason that this argument is not a complete proof is that there is a difference 
between convergence of utilities and the preferences that they represent. Consider, for 
example, the family of utility functions over the unit interval [O, 1] given by un(x) = x/n.
All these functions represent the same order on [O, 1]. The limit of the sequence of 
the utility functions is u0( x) = 0, which represents a different relation. In order for
the preferences to converge, the preference relation represented by the limit of the W, 
functions must be locally strict (see Section 3). 
We also propose an extension to allow zero probability events. If the first stage induces 
a nonatomic distribution of lotteries, so that each outcome has zero probability, then the 
definition in [21] induces ex post preferences that are completely indifferent among all 
lotteries. Indeed, the decision maker does not care ex ante what outcome he receives if a 
zero-probability event happens. (Expected utility too has difficulty conditioning on zero 
probability events.) By the above definition of dynamic consistency, this implies that ex 
post he is indifferent between all possible outcomes if this zero-probability event actually 
happens. If all possible events have zero probability, then ex post the decision maker 
will be indifferent between all simple lotteries. We suggest to remedy this by defining ex 
post preferences after a zero probability event as the limit of ex post preferences after 
low probability events. It follows that under this definition, ex post preferences after a 
zero probability event are always linear. 
Besides implying approximate linearity of preferences, dynamic consistency may imply 
discontinuity with respect to history. In Section 5, we discuss three formal definitions 
designed to formalize the notion of dynamic consistency and show that the only one 
that is immune to manipulation implies that ex post preferences must be even closer to 
expected utility. 
2 Compound lotteries and dynamic consistency
The set of prizes is a compact interval [a, b] of the real line, with a < b. The set £, 
of lotteries is the set of (countably additive) Borel probabilities on [a, b]. It is endowed 
with the topology of weak convergence. That is, associating to each probability X its 
cumulative distribution function Fx, where Fx(t) = X([a, t]), Xn -+ X if and only if
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Fx. converges to Fx at every point of continuity of Fx. This topology is metrizable and 
compact.1 
A compound lottery is a Borel measurable mapping 7r from [O, l ]  into .G. We shall 
write 7r s rather than 7r( s) to simplify notation. The idea is that first an s is chosen at
random from [O, l ]  according to Lebesgue measure m. Then the lottery 71", is played. 
This corresponds to the tree diagrams familiar in the literature. The branches of a tree 
correspond to subsets of [O, l] where 7r is constant. 
Every compound lottery 7r can be reduced to a lottery Z by the reduction formula 
Z(A) = { 7r,(A)dm(s).l[o,1] 
This is well defined for every Borel set A C [a, b] and does indeed define a countably 
additive probability. We can write Z as the vector integral i[o,i] 7r s dm( s) and refer to Z
as the reduction of 7r. We shall call 7r a finite compound lottery if 7r takes on only finitely 
many values in £., and if each of these values is assigned strictly positive probability by m. 
Note that this does not imply that the reduction of 7r has finite support. For instance, 
71"8 may be the uniform probability on [a, b] for every s. In this case, 7r assumes only one 
value, the uniform probability, but its reduction has full support on [a, b]. 
We now assume that a function V: £., -r lit represents the ex ante preferences over 
lotteries, and further that compound lotteries are ranked ex ante according to the value 
of their reduction under V. This assumption is known as the Reduction of Compound 
Lotteries Axiom. Thus we shall abuse notation and write V( 7r) for the value V assigns 
to the reduction of 7r. Given a compound lottery 7r, once a state s has been drawn, 
preferences over £., are represented by an ex post utility function W: £., -r lit. 
Machina [21] argues that these ex post preferences can depend on the risks born and 
the outcome at the first stage. That is, W must be indexed by 7r to represent the risks 
born and by 7r s to denote the outcome of the first stage. Thus we shall use the somewhat 
cumbersome notation W(- 171", X) to denote the ex post function used to evaluate lotteries 
in the second stage of the compound lottery 71", after drawing ans at the first stage with 
1l"s = X. 
There may be different ways in which the decision maker can use information regard­
ing risk previously born. For example, he may condition his behavior on what event 
happened, what state of the world happened, what is the outcome of previous stages 
(i.e., what actual lottery he now holds), or any combination of the above. We start with 
one such possible definition, and discuss its comparative merits, together with some other 
definitions, in Section 5 below. 
Given a compound lottery 7r and a measure X in the range of 7r, let R( 7r I X -r Z) 
1s'ee, e.g., Parthasarathy [25L for these standard resuits. 
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denote the function from [O, 1] into .C defined by replacing X everywhere by Z. That is, 
R(7r I X-+ Z) = {
'lrs 'lrs f X
s Z 'lrs = X. 
In the spirit of Machina we make the following definition. Its relationship to Machina's 
actual definition is discussed in Seotion 5. 
1 Definition A pair (V, W) of ex ante-ex post utility functions is outcomewise dynam­
ically consistent if for every finite compound lottery 7r, and every X in the range of 7r, 
W(Y j 7r, X)?:: W(Y' 17r, X) if and only if V(R(7r I X-+ Y))?:: V(R(7r IX-+ Y')) for 
every Y, Y' E .C. 
That is, the ex post utility of a lottery Y, after drawing X at the first stage of the 
compound lottery 7r, agrees with the ex ante utility of the compound lottery derived from 
7r by replacing X everywhere with Y. 
3 Differentiable preferences
In our discussion above, we took the limit of a sequence of preference orders. The 
standard way of taking such a limit is to use the Hausdorff metric2 on the graphs of 
the preference relations. This notion of convergence was introduced by Kannai [13] and 
Mas-Cole!! [22] and it has the property that if X n -+ X, Yn -+ Y, >.=n-+>.=, and X n >.=n Yn , 
then X >,: Y. Further, if >.=n-+>.= and X >-Y, then for large enough n, X >-n Y. If utility 
representations converge uniformly, and if the limiting utility is locally strict (we define 
this in the next paragraph), then the preferences they represent converge in this sense. 
See Appendix B for details. 
Define a preference>,: to be locally strict if for every (x, y) with x >,: y, every neigh­
borhood of (x, y) contains a pair (x',y') with x' >- y'. This condition rules out thick
indifference sets, but is weaker than local nonsatiation, as it allows for satiation points. 
This is important because .C is compact, so every continuous preference ordering has 
a satiation point. We shall say that a utility is locally strict if it represents a locally 
strict preference. Strict monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance ensures that 
preferences are locally strict. 
We shall restrict our attention to preferences having a differentiable utility. To define 
differentiability w.e shall embed .C in a normed vector space. Again identifying each 
2The Hausdorff metric on closed subsets of a compact metric space is defined by 
p(E,F) = inf{c > 0: EC N,(F) and F C N,(E)},
where N,(E) = {x: 3YyEE d(x,y) < t:}, the f-neighborhood of E. See Appendix B for more on this
topology. 
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probability X with its cumulative distribution function Fx, we can embed £. in the 
vector space Lp[a , b] of p-integrable functions on [a, b] for some 1 ::; p < oo. We point 
out here that this identification preserves the mixture space operations on £.. That is, 
.\Fx +(l-.\)Fz is the cumulative distribution function of .\X +(1-,\)Z. Wang [29] shows 
that the Lp norm on all of these spaces induces the weak topology on £.. Machina [20] 
uses the L1-norm, and Allen [1] advocates the Lrnorm. Some preferences, in particular,
anticipated utility preferences, have Lrdifferentiable utilities, but not L1-differentiable 
utilities [6]. Our results only depend on differentiability with respect to some norm, the 
actual norm does not matter. 
A function V is differentiable on £. if at each point Z E £. there is a linear function 
D Vz: B-+ JR with the following property. 
For every c > 0, there is a 8 > 0 such that if llXll < 8, then
I V(Z + X) - V(Z) -D Vz(X)I < cllXll-
This is the standard definition of (Frechet) differentiability, written in a more convenient 
form. If such a linear function. exists, then it is unique and continuous. It is important 
to remember that the derivative is a linear function from Lp to JR, not an element of JR. 
Machina [20] shows that L1 -differentiable utilities possess local utilities. That is, the 
derivative D Vz of V at Z has a representation of the form D Vz(X) = fra,b] uz(t) dX(t)
for a function uz: [a, b] -+ JR. The function uz is called the local utility at Z. If Uz is 
strictly increasing, then the preferences represented by D Vz are locally strict. Wang [29] 
generalizes the results of Machina and Allen [l] to all the Lp-spaces, 1 ::; p < oo. The 
choice of norm does not affect our proofs, all we require is differentiability in some norm 
for which the derivative can be represented as a local utility. The preferences represented 
by the derivative D V  are locally strict if the local utility representing D V  is strictly 
increasing. 
Our major result is that under outcomewise dynamic consistency, after a low prob­
ability event, ex post preferences must be close to expected utility preferences. The 
following theorem makes this result precise. 
2 Theorem Suppose V is continuously differentiable with D V  locally strict everywhere, 
and suppose ( V, W) is dynamically consistent. Let € > 0 be given. Then there is some 
8 > 0 such that for any X, if 7r is any compound lottery assigning X probability less than 
8, then there is a linear preference>,: such that the Hausdorff distance between >,: and the 
preferences represented by W ( - I 7r, X) is less than € • 
.t0ro0f: Let >rz,>. denote the preferences represented by the utility U(X) = V((l - c:)Z +
cX), and let >,:x denote the (linear) preferences represented by the local utility at X. 
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Lemma 6 and Theorem 8 in Appendix A show that if Z-+ X and,\.). 0, then >rz,>.-+>rx 
in the Hausdorff metric. 
Now let £ > 0 be given. For every X E £, there is a h'(X) > 0 such that if llZ -
XII < h'(X) and 0 < ,\ < h'(X), then the Hausdorff distance p(>rz,>., >rx) < c;. The 
collection { Ns(x)(X) : X E £.,} of balls of radius h'(X) around X is an open cover of 
£. Since £., is compact, there is a subcover corresponding to the finite set {X1, • . •  ,Xn}· 
Set h' = min; h'(X;). Then for every Z E £, there is some X; E {X1,. . . , Xn} with 
llZ -Xdl < h'. Furthermore, if for 0 < ,\ < h', we have p(>rz,>., >rx) < c;. Ill 
This theorem says that for any degree of approximation, there is a low enough prob­
ability so that ex post preferences after the realization of an event of this low probability 
are uniformly approximately linear. Lotteries with low probability outcomes are not un­
usual. Indeed the case where each of the prizes occurs with small probability is "typical " 
in a topological sense. Let £,, = { X E £., : 3ccE[a,b] X ( { c}) ::'.". £} , the set of lotteries where
some prize receives probability at least £. Then £.,, is closed and has an empty interior 
(cf. Parthasarathy [25, Theorem 8.1, p. 53]). That is, its complement is open and dense.
This means that £.,, is topologically a small subset of £.,. In this sense "most" lotteries 
involve small probability events. 
4 Zero probability events
Dynamic consistency runs into difficulty when tr is not finite. If X occurs with zero 
probability, dynamic consistency implies that W(· I tr,X) must be indifferent among all 
lotteries. It is quite easy to construct compound lotteries in which each elementary lottery 
occurs with probability zero. In this case, ex post preferences are flat, no matter what 
happens at the first stage. In order to circumvent this difficulty, we propose to extend 
the notion of outcomewise dynamic consistency to more general compound lotteries along 
the following lines. If X in the range of tr is assigned zero probability by m, we want 
to look at the ex post preferences induced by a compound lottery derived from tr, but 
which assigns probability £ to X. We then let c; decrease to zero, and take the limit 
of these preferences (in the topology of closed convergence). We view this as being in 
the same spirit as Kreps and Wilson's [17] consistency condition for beliefs in sequential 
equilibrium. 
3 Definition A pair (V, W) of ex ante-ex post utilities is outcomewise strongly dynam­
ically consistent if it is dynamically consistent in the sense of Definition 1 and if X in the 
range of compound lottery tr has probability zero under m, then W(- I tr,X) represents 
>rz, which is defined as follows. Let Z be the reduction of tr, and let the preference >rz,. 
on £., to be represented by the utility function 
Uz, (·) = V((l - i;)Z + o:·).
If the limit as€ .j_ 0 of>rz,  exists, call it );oz. 
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We first show that the limit in Definition 3 exists for differentiable utilities. 
4 Theorem Suppose 71" has reduction Z, lottery X in the range of 71" has probability 
zero under m, the utility V is differentiable at Z and DVz is locally strict, and (V, W) is 
outcomewise strongly dynamically consistent. Then the limit as c: -!- 0 of>,. z,. exists and 
is represented by the derivative DVz of V at Z. 
Proof: Note that >,oz,. is represented by 
V((l - c:)Z + c: ·) - V(Z) 
which converges uniformly on £, to DVz(· - Z). Theorem 8 implies that the limit >,oz 
exists and is represented by the utility W(Y) = DVz(Y - Z). By linearity, DVz(Y) is a 
positive affine transformation of DVz(Y - Z) and so represents >,oz . II 
Note well what this says. The derivative DVz is a linear function. That is, it satisfies 
the independence axiom, and' so is an expected utility ordering. Thus for nonatomic 
compound lotteries, those assigning probability zero to every lottery in their range, all 
the ex post preferences, as defined in Definition 3 are expected utility orderings. 
5 Manipulation and continuity with respect to his­
tory 
The idea that dynamically consistent preferences depend on previously born risk lends 
itself to (at least) three formal definitions. These definitions differ in the information that 
the preferences may be conditioned on: With respect to outcomes (Definition 1 above), or 
with respect to arbitrary events (Definition 5 below), or with respect to "branch" of the 
decision tree (also decribed below). In this section we show that under the first definition, 
the ex post preferences may not be continuous with respect to previous uncertainty.3 It 
turns out that the alternative definition may expose the decision maker to manipulations. 
The third definition (Machina's [21] definition) solves both the discontinuity and Dutch 
books problems. However, in view of our major result (Theorem 2), this last definition 
implies that next period's preferences must be even closer to expected utility than under 
Definition 1. 
3There are two ways we can make precise the notion of convergence for compound lotteries. The 
first is just convergence in distribution. That is, 11'n -+ 11' if and only if Jc cp(X) d(m11';;1 )(X) -+ 
Jc cp(X) d(m11'-I )(X) for every continuous real function cp on £. The second notion of convergence
is that of convergence in measure. That is, 1rn � 1r if and only if for every c > 0, li!Iln-+oci m{ s : 
1111'n,,-11',ll > £} = 0. Our analysis can use either notion.
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Consider the sequence of compound lotteries 7rn = (X, p;Yn,q;Z,1 -p -q), n =
0, . . .  oo, where Yn-+ Yo. Suppose first that Yo =IX. The ex post preferences, given that 
the decision maker wins X, is given by 
W(X' I 7rn,X) - V(R(7rn I X-+ X')) 
Since V is continuous, 
- V(X',p; Yn, q; Z, 1-p-q). 
V(X', p;Yn, q;Z,1-p-q)-+ V(X', p;Yo, q;Z,1-p-q) 
- W(X' J 7ro, X).
In other words, W(X' I 7rn,X)-+ W(X' I 7ro,X). 
Consider however the case Y0 = X where for every n � 1 ,  Y.. =IX. Then 
W(X' l1rn,X) = V(X',p;Yn,q;Z, l-p-q) 
-+ V(X', p;X, q;Z,1-p-q) 
# V(X', p +q;Z,1-p-q)
= W(X' I 7ro, X). 
Not only are V(., p; X, q; Z, 1-p-q) and V(., p + q; Z, 1-p-q) different in their values,
but if the decision maker does not maximize a betweenness4 (see (4, 7]) functional, then it 
may well happen that these two functions are not even ordinally equivalent. For example, 
it may happen that 
(X', p + q; Z, 1 -p -q) >-(X, p + q; Z, 1 -p -q) >-(X', p; X, q; Z, 1 -p -q), 
hence, W(X' I 7ro, X) > W(X I 7ro, X), but for every n � 1, W(X I 7rn, X) > W(X' I 
7rn, X). It thus follows that W (and the ex post preference relation) are not continuous
in the ex ante options. 
There is of course nothing wrong with the possibility of having preferences that are 
not continuous. However, it is obvious from the above analysis that non-betweenness 
preferences must have points of discontinuity with respect to born risk. 
Some may argue that offers should be made conditional on events rather than out­
comes. In other words, when the decision maker is offered the chance to replace a lottery 
X by Y, he assumes that this offer is made conditional on some past event (which led
to his holding of X), and not on the fact that he holds X. In particular, it may be that 
this choice would have been offered to him even if he had received other lotteries in the 
first stage, or would not have been offered if some other event leading to X had occurred, 
even if the outcoll1e in this case were X. Formally, for a compound lottery 7r, event E, 
and a lottery Z, let 
R( 7r I E -+ Z) = { z s E E 
7r, stf.E 
4The preference relation '.::satisfies the betweenness axiom if [X '.:: Y] =:- ['v'a E [O, l] X '.:: aX + (1 -
a)Y '.:: Y].
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In other words, R( 7r I E ---t Z) is the compound lottery obtained from 7r by replacing the 
outcomes of 7r in case E happens by Z. 
5 Definition A pair (V, W) of ex ante-ex post utility functions is eventwise dynamically 
consistent if for every finite compound lottery 7r, lottery Z and event E, 
W(Z J 7r,E) = V(R(7r IE ---t Z)).
That is, the ex post utility of a lottery Z, after s E E happens, agrees with the ex 
ante utility of the compound lottery derived from 7r by replacing 7r, by Z on E.
This kind of dynamic consistency exposes the decision maker to Dutch books. Suppose 
that the decision maker's non-expected utility preferences satisfy 
(X, T; X, �T) >-- (Y, T; Y, �T) >-- (X, T; Y, �T)
where �Tis the event "not T" and Pr(T) E (0, 1). Suppose the decision maker possesses
the compound lottery (X, T; Y, �T) . In each state s E T he is offered the chance to
replace the outcome conditional on T by Y. By the definition of eventwise dynamic 
consistency he is willing to pay a positive amount of money for this option. Next, offer 
him a chance to replace the outcome Y conditional on TU �T by X. Again, he is willing 
to pay a positive sum for this offer. Eventually, he will play X, his states outcome, but 
will pay twice for it. Note that this analysis does not require that anyone will be trying 
to cheat the decision maker. However, since we know that s E T happened, there is no 
way to check whether these offers are genuine or not. 
It is important to note that this analysis does not depend in any way on "hidden 
nodes " .  In fact, even if the decision maker knows in advance what options will be offered 
to him after the first stage of the uncertainty is resolved, it still follows from Definition 5 
that he will trade X for Y and then again for X. 
There is one way in which Definition 5 does not lead to such Dutch books. If all 
offers must be restricted to the actual state s that happened, then such a manipulation 
as described above is impossible. But then, as we showed in Section 4, the updated 
preferences must always be expected utility. 
This brings us to Machina's definition of dynamic consistency. We assume that the 
decision maker is endowed with a partition of states of the world that is at least as 
fine as the partition induced by 7r. The elements of this partition are called branches. 
Suppose the compound lottery 7r yielded lottery X, but the decision maker knows that 
branch E in the partition actually occurred. Then he should evaluate lotteries ex post
by substituting only on E and not on all of 7r-1(X). This feature eliminates the disconti­
nuity and manipulation discussed above, but makes the probability of the realized event 
even' smailer, and so strengthens the conciusions about approximate iinearity of ex post
preferences. 
1 1  
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we discussed some aspects of dynamic consistency. Our major claim is that 
if dynamic consistency means that the preference relation (over lotteries) in the next 
period is the same as the conditional preference relation today, then it will almost always 
be arbitrarily close to expected utility. One possible claim against our analysis is that 
although it is true that next period preferences are going to be close to linear, this puts 
no restrictions whatsoever on today's preferences. This is of course true, but it ignores 
the fact that today is yesterday's tomorrow. In other words, we cannot neglect problems 
in the future, because at each point of time we already are in the future of previous 
periods. 
This observation is also relevant to another possible objection to our analysis. Theo­
rem 2 shows that topologically, next period's preferences are almost always as close as we 
wish to expected utility. One may argue that this topological sense is irrelevant, because 
it assumes a certain kind of uniformity over this period's compound lotteries, whereas in 
the real world, most compound lotteries involve a small number of possible outcomes (an 
outcome by itself being a ticket for a lottery in the next period), each with a sufficiently 
large probability. In other words, even if they are topologically rare, compound lotteries 
where at least one of the outcomes is received with probability greater then c (we de­
noted the set of these lotteries by .C,) are the typical case the decision maker faces today. 
This may be so. However, it is unrealistic to assume that there are only two periods 
in life. If we consider compound lotteries over n periods, then dynamic consistency is 
defined inductively, where the compound lotteries the decision maker faces at period i + 1 
are reduced by the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, and the preference relation 
at this period is required to be dynamically consistent with the preference relation at 
period i. Even if at each period there are few possible outcomes, each with sufficiently 
large probability (say larger than c:), the probability of each final outcome in an n-stage
lottery tends to zero as n increases, unless from a certain stage on there is almost no 
uncertainty, and a certain branch of the tree is received with probability arbitrarily close 
to one. 
It may seem as though Theorem 2 is relevant not for the preference relation over the 
whole set .C, but only for a small subset of it. More specifically, we are interested in the 
relation between X and Y given that probability 1 - .A is assigned to the outcome Z. As
A decreases to zero, the domain of our discussion also shrinks to zero. This is technically 
true, but irrelevant. It is true that the ex ante domain goes down to zero. However, we 
are interested in the ex post relation (representable by W). The domain of this preference 
relation is .C, no matter how small .A > 0 is. 
It would be wrong to conclude from this paper that dynamic consistency must im­
ply expected utility behavior. An alternative approach to dynamic consistency under 
uncertainty is discussed in Kami and Safra [14, 15]. Another approach is suggested by 
Segal [27] , where the preference relation is assumed to satisfy a compound independence 
axiom, but to violate the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. This approach is useful 
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in proving the existence of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences [8]. 
One may of course argue that violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom 
expose the decision maker to another kind of Dutch book. We discuss the validity of such 
arguments in [3] (see also [28]). If we are willing to assume both consequentialism and 
the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, Kami and Schmeidler [16] show that dynamic 
consistency is equivalent to expected utility. Finally, Epstein and Le Breton [9] discuss 
dynamic consistency in a Savage-like framework and raise question about the appeal of 
models of preferences that feature a separation of tastes and beliefs. 
Appendix A: Results on Differentiability 
Given a function V, define the difference quotient 
f>z,,\(X) = 
V(Z + .\�) - V(Z)
. 
An equivalent definition of differentiability of V at Z, is that as .\ --+ 0 the difference 
quotient f>z,,\ converges unifoqnly to DVz on norm bounded sets. 
The function V is continuously differentiable if the mapping Z i-+ DVz is continuous, 
where the space of continuous linear functionals on Lp is topologized by the operator 
norm. That is, if V is continuously differentiable and if Zn --+ Z, then the linear function 
DVz. converges uniformly to the linear function DVz on norm bounded subsets of LP'
For continuously differentiable functions we have the following stronger result. 
6 Lemma Suppose V: G--+ IW. is continuously differentiable on an open convex set G.
Then the difference quotient f>z,,\(h) converges to DVx(h) uniformly on norm bounded 
sets as Z --+ X and l.\I i 0. That is, for every c: > 0 and M > 0, for every X E G, there
is 8 > 0, such that 
lf>z,,\(h) - DVx(h)I < c:, 
whenever llhll < M, 0 < l.\I < 8, and llZ - XII < 8.
Proof: This follows from [19, Corollary to 7. 4, p. 1 49]. 
Appendix B: Utilities and preferences
Ill 
It is usually more convenient to work with utilities than with preferences when discussing 
com:ergence. In this section we outline the general relation between convergence of 
utilities and convergence of preferences. 
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It is well known that if utilities converge uniformly on compact sets, the corresponding 
preferences converge in the topology of closed convergence, provided the limit preference 
is locally nonsatiated. Mas-Cole!! [22, 1.18, p. 313] proves this result for the case of 
convex preferences on Euclidean spaces, but does not use convexity in the proof. We 
cannot use this theorem however. The problem is that our preferences are not locally 
nonsatiated, as the lottery yielding b with probability one is a satiation point. 
It is for this reason that we introduce the notion of locally strict preferences. Recall 
that � is locally strict if for every (x,y) with x � y, in every neighborhood of (x,y) 
there is a pair (x',y') with x' >- y'. This condition is weaker than local nonsatiation, as 
it allows for satiation points. It implies that the graph of � has no isolated points, but 
is stronger: The preference where all lotteries are indifferent has no isolated points, but 
is not locally strict. Local strictness exactly characterizes the continuity points of the 
mapping from utilities to preferences. For example, Un(x) = �x on the reals converges
uniformly on compacta to zero, but the preferences remain strict until the limit. The 
preferences represented by the zero function make everything indifferent and are not 
locally strict. On the other hand, U(x) = -[x[ is locally strict, and if Un -t U uniformly 
on compacta, then the preferences do converge, even though U has a satiation point. 
We only deal with preferences on £, a compact metric space, but we state the next 
theorem more generally, since the proof is no harder. Recall that a topological space 
is locally compact if every point has a compact neighborhood. Every compact space is 
locally compact. We will need the following fact [18, Theorem 41.8, p. 44]. 
7 Theorem If M is locally compact separable metrizable space, then there is a sequence 
K1, K2, . .. of compact sets satisfying M = U�=1 Kn and Kn c int Kn+i for all n.
Furthermore M is hemicompact, that is, every compact subset K of M is contained 
in some Kn. 
Thus let (M, d) be a locally compact separable metric space, and let K1, K2, • . .  be 
a sequence of compact subsets of M given by Theorem 7. The topology of uniform 
convergence on compacta on C(M) is generated by the metric 
d(f,g) = f: min {� • sup d(f(x),g(x))} .
n=l 2 xEKn 
(This topology is the same as the compact-open topology on C(M).) A sequence fn -t f 
in this topology if and only if fn[K -t /IK uniformly on every compact subset K of 
M. If M is compact, then this is just the topology of uniform convergence on M. See 
Willard [30, Section 43] for these results. 
for locally compact separable metric spaces, there is a generalization of the Hausdorff 
metric topology on the collection of closed subsets. It is called the topology of closed 
convergence. It is a compact metrizable topology and a sequence Fn of nonempty closed 
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sets converges to Fin the topology of closed convergence if and only if LiFn = F = LsFn, 
where 
and 
"' 
LsFn = { x : for every neighborhood G of  x, n LJ (Fn n G) of 0 }, 
m=ln�m 
"' 
Li.Fn = { x: for every neighborhood G o f  x, LJ n (Fn n G) of 0 }. 
m=ln�m 
If M is compact, this topology is generated by the Hausdorff metric. See Hildenbrand [12, 
Section B.II, pp. 15-21] for these results. Clearly LiFn C LsFn for any sequence. Thus 
to show convergence, we need only show that LsFn C F C LiFn. We mention here that
since we will be considering subsets of M x M, that if M is a locally compact space, so 
is M x M [30, Theorem 18.6, p. 131]. 
For a continuous function U E C(M), let >Fu denote the preference induced by U.
That is, x >Fu y if and only if U(x) 2 U(y). Define Ill: C(M)-+ '.P by Ill: U >-+)ru. 
8 Theorem Let M be a locally compact separable metric space. Let '.P denote the 
set of continuous preferences on M, topologized with the topology of closed convergence. 
Let C(M) be topologized with the topology of uniform convergence on compacta. lf>ru is
locally strict, then Ill is continuous at U. If M has no isolated points, and Ill is continuous 
at U, then >Fu is locally strict.
Proof: We first show that if >Fu is locally strict, then Ill is continuous at U. So suppose
Un -+ U, and write >Fn for Ill( Un)· We wish to show that Ls >rnC>FuC Li >Fn·
If (x, y) E Ls >Fn· Then there is a sequence {(xn, Yn)} converging to ( x, y ), with
Xn >Fn y. Thus Un(xn) 2 Un(Yn) for each n. Since Un converges uniformly to U, Thus
Un(xn)-+ U(x) and Un(Y)-+ U(y). Consequently x >Fu y, so Ls >rnC>ru. 
Next suppose x >Fu y and let G be a neighborhood of (x, y ). Since >Fu is locally
strict, there is some (x', y') E G with x' >- y'. Thus U(x') > U(y'). Since Un -+ U,
for large enough n we have Un(x') > Un(y'). Thus >Fn nG of 0 for large n. Therefore
(x, y) E Li >Fn· That is, >ruC Li >Fn· 
Therefore, >rn -+>Fu in the topology of closed convergence, and Ill is continuous at U.
Now suppose M has no isolated points and >ru is not locally strict. We shall construct
a sequence Un converging to U that satisfies >ru. f+>ru-
So suppose x >Fu y, but there is a neighborhood Nx x Ny of (x,y) with the property
that, for all y' E Ny and all x' E Nx, we have y' >ru x'. Replacing y by y' of y if
necessary, we may assume x of y. (We can do this since y is not isolated.) We may 
also take then take Nx and Ny to be disjoint compact sets. By Urysohn's Lemma [30, 
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Theorem 15.6, p. 102], there is a continuous function f on M taking on values in [O, l]
with J(Nx) = 1 and f(Ny) = 0. Now set Un = U - �f. Then Un converges uniformly
to U, and Un(x') < Un(Y') for each x' E Nx and y' E Ny. Thus Nx X Ny contains no
points in the graph of '-'un, and so ( x, y) does not belong to Ls '-'u.. That is, W is not
continuous at U. Ill 
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